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Book Reviews 
Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy: An Argument Against Legalisation. 
by John Keown, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.xx+318 
pp . Index . 
John Keown, currently Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy Professor at the 
Kennedy Institute of Bioethics at Georgetown University, offers a 
compelling, comprehensive, and clearly written argument against the 
legalization of euthanasia. 
The work includes an Introduction, six Parts subdivided into 21 
Chapters, an important Afterword, bibliography, and index. In Part I 
Keown gives reasons for rejecting definitions of euthanasia advocated by 
its champions. One limits euthanasia to the active intentional termination 
of life when death is judged beneficial, ignoring euthanasia by 
intentionally killing people by acts of omission; another conflates and 
regards as morally equivalent treatment omissions intended to bring death 
about and treatment omissions foreseen but not intended to be life-
shortening. Keown properly defines euthanasia as the intentional 
termjnation of life by act or omission (a definition in harmony with the 
Vatican Declaration on Euthanasia). 
Keown devotes one chapter of Part I to a defense, philosophical and 
jurisprudential, of the crucial moral difference between intending evil and 
merely foreseeing evil , a di stinction crucial to the principle of double 
effect. 
In Part II Keown first takes up three arguments for VAE and PAS and 
three counter-arguments. The arguments in favor are: (I) that life is not 
always a benefit and that it is thus justifiable to kill a patient at his request 
when he would be better off dead; (2) that respect for patient autonomy 
requires VAE and PAS; (3) that present law is hypocritical in allowing 
passive VAE and PAS while prohibiting active VAE and PAS. 
Keown challenges these arguments by pointing out that the first is 
not only inconsistent with the principle of the inviolability of life but is also 
arbitrary and unjust in holding that only patients with arbitrarily defined 
abilities have a right not to be killed intentionally, that the second fails to 
recognize that many requests for euthanasia are not really autonomous and, 
more importantly, that autonomy 's value lies not in making just any choice 
but choices in accord with sound moral values, and that the third clearly 
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leads to nonvoluntary active euthanasia (NVAE) and thus undercuts the 
claim that its proponents support only VAE. 
The final chapter of Part II is crucial to Keown's case against 
legalizing VAE and PAS. He himself regards it as the centerpiece of his 
study, for in it he develops two forms of the "slippery slope" argument 
which holds that even if VAE and PAS were morally justifiable in certain 
hard cases (which, as he makes clear, they are not) the killing of patients 
could not be effectively controlled and limited to those cases. 
Consequently, Keown argues, many who see nothing wrong with 
VAE and PAS in principle do not want the law to permit it in practice 
because it would likely lead to justifying NVAE. The slippery slope 
argument holds that if a proposal is made to accept A (e.g., VAE), which is 
not agreed to be morally objectionable, it would lead to B (e.g. , NVAE), 
which is agreed to be morally objectionable. 
Keown develops two forms of the argument, the empirical and the 
logical. The empirical holds that one will slip from VAE to NVAE because 
of the grave difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcing safeguards to 
prevent the slide (e.g. , to make sure that consent to euthanasia is truly 
autonomous). The logical version holds that the slide will occur because 
the arguments for accepting VAE and PAS logically provide arguments for 
accepting NV AE . 
Part IV provides massive evidence, based on Keown's own research 
over ten years, to show that efforts in The Netherlands to restrict the killing 
of terminal patients to VAE have failed miserably. Keown carefully 
reviews empirical evidence provided primarily by two surveys carried out 
by PJ. van der Maas and associates on behalf of the government, one in 
1990 and the other in 1995, and secondarily by research done by himself 
and other independent scholars, to support the conclusion. He argues that 
the failure of the Dutch effectively to control VAE "lends weighty support 
to the empirical slippery slope argument, and their growing approval of 
NVAE illustrates the force of the logical slippery slope argument." 
Part IV considers the legalization of PAS in the Northern Territory of 
Australia in 1995 and by Oregon in the US in 1994 and implemented in 
that state in 1997. Keown shows that the experience of Australia's 
Northern Territory, where the law, called Rights of the Terminally III Act or 
ROTTI permitting both VAE and PAS was repealed in 1997, fully supports 
the validity of the slippery slope argument. The law lacked any way of 
systematically supervising the application of its guidelines-themselves 
not very precise-by medical doctors so that the possibility of effective 
regulation of the law was even less than it had proved to be in the 
Netherlands. 
Keown regards the Oregon law-the Death with Dignity Act-as the 
most permissive regime for PAS yet devised, with even less protection 
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against abuse than the Dutch law or ROITI. Empirical evidence shows 
that the law gives more power to doctors than to patients, its alleged 
safeguards against abuse are largely illusory, and that most Oregon patients 
seeking PAS are clinically depressed and yet are rarely referred for 
counseling. The Oregon experience thus also confirms the validity of the 
slippery slope arguments. 
In Part V Keown reviews "expert" opinion on the advisability of 
VAE and PAS, namely, the opinion provided by (1) medical committees 
established by the British House of Lords, the Canadian Senate, and the 
State of New York, (2) supreme courts in England, Canada, and the US 
(considerable attention is given to the opinions in two cases - Washington 
v. Gluckberg and Vacco, Attorney-General of New York et al. v. Quill et al 
- reversing lower court decisions striking down laws prohibiting PAS), 
and (3) the British, Canadian, and American medical associations. All 
these experts vigorously oppose legalizing VAE and/or PAS. 
Part VI is devoted to a detailed discussion of passive euthanasia or 
euthanasia by withholding/withdrawing treatment, in particular the tube 
feeding of severely compromised persons, and even more particularly of 
those alleged to be in the "persistent vegetative state." 
Keown begins this part with a presentation of the famous (or 
infamous) Tony Bland case in England. The reasoning in Bland represents 
a turn from an ethic respecting the inviolability of life toward a quality of 
life ethic, holding that some lives are of no benefit or value to the persons 
whose lives they are and that consequently they may be intentionally 
terminated by starvation and dehydration. It regards individual autonomy 
as demanding respect for choices simply by virtue of being choices, 
ignoring their object. It fully legitimates intentional killing by acts of 
omission while still prohibiting active euthanasia and is thus hypocritical. 
It is moreover rooted in a terrible misunderstanding of the traditional ethic 
respecting the inviolability of life, and opens the door to the killing of 
patients who are not in the "persistent vegetative state." 
Bland, in short, was bad law, but unfortunately, as Keown goes on to 
show in the next chapter of Part VI, it was shortly followed by the 1999 
guidelines prepared by the British Medical Association regarding the 
withholding and withdrawing of treatments. These guidelines justify 
nontreatment on the grounds, not that the treatments are burdensome or 
useless, but on the grounds that the lives maintained by the treatments are 
burdensome or useless and that one can thus intentionally terminate them 
by purposeful omission. Keown shows how these guidelines lead to 
justifying the intentional killing by omission not only of patients in the 
"pvs" condition but also of persons severely impaired mentally. They also 
appear to invite doctors to assist even suicidal treatment refusals, something 
hard to square with the BMA opposition to PAS. The guidelines were 
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revised in 2001. Unfortunately, however, nothing in the revision addresses, 
let alone answers, criticism of the 1999 guidelines. 
Keown then considers the Winterton Bill, introduced into Parliament 
in December 1999 by Ann Winterton, in an attempt to reverse the 
movement begun by Bland and developed by the BMA guidelines. It 
provided that it is unlawful to deny treatment if the or a purpose of doing 
so is to hasten or cause death. The BMA and British government opposed 
Winterton on specious grounds, as Keown shows, and the bill was 
withdrawn so that British law remains " in the morally and intellectually 
mi sshapen state fashioned by the Law Lords in Bland. " 
The important Afterword allows Keown to end his book on a hopeful 
note. It concerns the Diane Pretty Case submitted to English courts in late 
2001 (after the substance of Keown's book had been written). Mrs. Pretty 
maintained that the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms guaranteed a right to assisted suicide. Both the 
English Divisional Court and the House of Lords, to which Pretty 
appealed, unanimously dismissed her claim. Although in doing so, the 
House of Lords neither endorsed nor overturned Bland, it correctly 
understood the inviolability of human life principle as distinguishing 
between treatment omissions intended to bring death about and those 
merely foreseen to result in death. Moreover, the House of Lords 
recognized that the legal prohibition of assisted suicide was consistent with 
"a very broad international consensus" and that if the law were to allow 
assisted suicide for the "non-vulnerable" it "could not be administered 
fairly and in way which could command respect." The House of Lords also 
noted the risk of the slippery slope evident in the arguments used to 
support Pretty 's claim. Thus this case again illustrates the cogency of the 
slippery slope arguments which, Keown notes, "continue to impede the 
decriminalization ofYAE and PAS around the world." 
Keown 's work is written in a very clear way. Moreover, each 
Chapter and Part ends with a "Conclusion" in which Keown masterfully 
summarizes the argument he has developed. His work is rooted in sound 
ethical thought and is of particular value for its contribution to the 
jurisprudential issues raised by euthanasia and assisted suicide. It is a most 
welcome addition to the literature. 
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